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Firmly embedded in every theory of judicial decisionmaking lies an
important set of assumptions about the way government is supposed to
work. Sometimes these theories about government are made explicit.
More often they are not. Moreover, deeply embedded in every theory of
government is a theory of human nature. Although these assumptions
about human nature generally remain latent within the larger theory,
because they provide the underpinnings for our ideas about the way gov-
ernment is supposed to work, they drive our notions about judicial deci-
sionmaking. For example, the theory of government reflected in the
United States Constitution
reveals what one would call a "realistic" view of human nature-i.e., a view
that is more alert to the absence of human virtues than to their presence, a
view that is skeptical of the ability of human beings to govern themselves
without the prior imposition of severe institutional self-restraints. There is
no visible "democratic faith" in this Constitution.1
In other words, the model of human nature that guided the framers as-
sumed that both the rulers and the citizenry are rational, self-interested,
utility-maximizing individuals who will be unable to govern themselves
wisely without the imposition of severe institutional restraints on their
power.2
The framers feared that some would abuse their power by seeking to
advance their own selfish interests through political activity. This self-
interest might take form in the organization of narrow special interest
groups designed to transfer wealth to themselves from the population as
a whole. Thus, the U.S. Constitution was the first constitution in world
history expressly designed to confront the problems of interest-group op-
portunism by channeling and constraining the self-interest of politicians
and their constituents. 3
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I wish to thank Christine E. Cahill
and Deborah A. Shapiro of the Cornell Law School class of 1995 for their able research assistance.
1 Irving Kristol, The Spirit of '87, PUB. INTEREST, winter 1987, at 3, 3.
2 Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471, 485-86 (1988).
3 Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GFo. WASH. L. REv.
50, 57 (1987).
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The purpose of this essay is to place the essays by James B. Thayer4
and Robert F. Nagel5 in the context of the framers' view of human na-
ture. Basically, my argument is that Thayer's view of the role of the
judiciary is fully consistent with the framers' views of both human nature
and how government is supposed to work, while Nagel's view is starkly
at odds with the framers' constitutional theory and design. My essay
begins with a description of the framers' view of human nature and pro-
ceeds to a discussion of Thayer's view of human nature. In the final
section, I discuss Professor Nagel's view of human nature and attempt to
show how this view is at odds with the Founders' design.
II. THE FRAMERS' VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE: SELF-INTEREST
The Constitution attempts to channel human nature in general and
self-interest in particular in three distinct ways. First, by establishing a
federal scheme, the framers attempted to set up a competitive system of
government in which local governments would have an incentive to pass
efficient laws in order to prevent exit by citizens disadvantaged by ineffi-
cient legal rules. A federal system creates competition among the provid-
ers of legal rules, thereby causing politicians to suffer the costs associated
with citizen exit if they enact sub-optimal legal rules.
Put another way, as long as there are viable substitutes for an ex-
isting political regime, the state will find it difficult to extract wealth from
its constituents if they may move to other states at low cost. The Ameri-
can Constitution was established with the idea that the individual states
would compete for citizens. Thus, the Constitution provides that the cit-
izens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of
citizens of every other state.6
Second, the framers placed a number of outright prohibitions on
Congress in order to mitigate the problem of self-interest. The most ob-
vious example of course is the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on takings
of private property. In addition, the constitutional protections of speech
and press "protect the integrity of the political process to insure that the
country will adopt the course of action that conforms to the wishes of the
greatest number."'7 Moreover, the Commerce Clause, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process
Clause, and the Contract Clause are all "united by a common theme and
focused on a single underlying evil: the distribution of resources or op-
portunities to one group rather than another solely on the ground that
those favored have exercised the raw political power to obtain what they
4 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
5 Robert F. Nagel, Name-Calling and the Clear Error Rule, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 193 (1993).
6 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
7 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 62 (1975) (summarizing the views of
Robert Bork and Alexander Meikeljohn).
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want." 8
Third and most importantly, the very structure of the Constitution
itself was designed to block the power of legislatures to transfer wealth to
special interest groups. The structural features in the Constitution that
protect property rights by reducing the efficacy of interest group activity
are as follows: (1) the provision for a bicameral legislature in which the
House and the Senate are of different sizes and represent different constit-
uencies; (2) the executive veto; and (3) the provision for an independent
judiciary.
With regard to the bicameral legislature, Robert McCormick and
Robert Tollison have demonstrated empirically that for a fixed number
of total legislators, interest groups fare better in the market for legislation
where the legislators are distributed equally between the houses. 9 By
contrast, where the members of each house of a bicameral legislature
represent different constituencies and where the two houses must concur
to pass a law, it is more difficult and more costly for interest groups to
ensure the passage of legislation that furthers their interests. This is be-
cause the cost of making collective decisions goes up in a nonlinear fash-
ion-such costs increase at a faster rate than the growth in the size of the
legislature.10 As a result, if the total size of the legislature is held con-
stant, increasing the size of one house (with a concomitant decrease in
the size of the other house) raises the cost to an interest group of ob-
taining agreement in that house by an amount that is greater than the
group's savings in the other house.
Thus, for example, the cost to an interest group of obtaining a
wealth transfer in a bicameral legislature of 200 will increase if the legis-
lature moves from a structure in which there are 100 people in each
house to a representative body in which there are 160 representatives in
one house and 40 in another house. This is because the "logic of collec-
tive action" dictates that the increase in costs to interest groups of effec-
tuating wealth transfers in the body of 160 will increase by more than the
decrease in the cost of purchasing influence in the body of 40.
Consistent with this analysis, Article I of the Constitution, which
sets forth the composition of the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives, clearly envisions a bicameral legislature in which the houses are of
radically different size. Section 2, Clause 3 of Article I provides that
membership in the House of Representatives shall not exceed one for
every thirty thousand people, while Section 3, Clause 2 of Article I pro-
vides that the Senate shall be composed of two Senators from each state.
Similarly, the provision in Article I, Section 2 allowing for the
8 Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1689
(1984).
9 ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE
ECONOMY 45-57 (1981).
10 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 53-65 (1971).
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growth of the House of Representatives as the population grows is an-
other structural feature designed to protect property rights by controlling
the efficacy of interest groups. This is consistent with the expectation
that rent-seeking will increase as the population grows larger, but be-
come more difficult as the legislature grows. The executive veto raises
costs to interest groups in much the same way as does the bicameral
legislature. The veto permits the executive branch to act as a third house
of the legislature, thus furthering the cost to interest groups of obtaining
favorable legislation.
The provision for an independent judiciary also protects property
rights by raising the costs to interest groups of destroying such rights.
While it is clear that the independent judiciary does not fully live up to
its intended role in the constitutional scheme as a vehicle for protecting
property rights, it is also clear that the judiciary continues to play an
important, albeit needlessly self-constrained, role in the protection of
property rights.
III. THAYER AND THE FRAMERS
At first blush, James Bradley Thayer's classic article would seem to
conflict with the basic view of human nature embraced by the framers.
The essence of Thayer's argument was that courts should declare legisla-
tive acts unconstitutional only when the law in question is "not merely
... a mistake, but.., a very clear one-so clear that it is not open to
rational question."11 This argument appears to conflict with the views of
the framers because it undermines the judiciary as an important institu-
tional restraint on the power of government. Interestingly, however,
Thayer did not want to weaken the judiciary. He wanted to preserve and
protect it by insulating it as much as possible from attack by the
legislature.
Thayer did not see the judiciary as a branch of government inferior
or subordinate to the Congress. Rather, Thayer saw the judiciary as a
co-equal branch of government with a unique and specialized role to play
within a divided government. Thayer's view was that the legislature spe-
cializes in crafting laws while the courts specialize in construing such
laws. For Thayer, the problem with unfettered judicial review of legisla-
tive acts was that it provides judges with the power both to revise the
actions of the other branches and to declare those actions null.12
For Thayer, judicial deference to legislative acts was based not on a
view that the courts should be subservient to the legislature, but rather
on the view that such deference was necessary to preserve the specialized
and compartmentalized nature of the American constitutional scheme.
Thayer's desire to preserve the specialized and compartmentalized nature
11 Thayer, supra note 4, at 144.
12 Id. at 152.
88:226 (1993)
HeinOnline -- 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 229 1993-1994
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
of government did not arise out of distrust of the courts or faith in the
legislature. Instead, Thayer's article was an attempt to strengthen rather
than to weaken the judiciary by protecting it from the wrath of the legis-
lature. For Thayer, it was important that the judiciary use its power to
review legislative acts sparingly in order to promote public confidence in
it as an institution and to reduce the incidence of confrontation between
the judiciary and the legislature-confrontations the judiciary was sure
to lose.
In my view, the most important passage in the Thayer article is the
quotation from Chancellor Waties:
The interference of the judiciary with legislative Acts, if frequent or on du-
bious grounds, might occasion so great a jealousy of this power and so gen-
eral a prejudice against it as to lead to measures ending in the total
overthrow of the independence of the judges, and so of the best preservative
of the constitution. The validity of the law ought not then to be questioned
unless it is so obviously repugnant to the constitution that when pointed out
by the judges, all men of sense and reflection in the community may per-
ceive the repugnancy. By such a cautious exercise of this judicial check, no
jealousy of it will be excited, the public confidence in it will be promoted,
and its salutary effects be justly and fully appreciated. 13
From this passage emerge two critical, but generally unrecognized points
about Thayer's desire to limit the exercise of judicial review. First,
Thayer saw the benefits of an activist judiciary. As the passage above
demonstrates, he clearly recognized the "salutary effects" of the judicial
check on legislative enactments. Second, Thayer had a healthy distrust
of legislatures.
For Thayer, the judiciary's power to review legislative enactments
was derived from the Court's constitutional authority to decide the cases
that come before it. 14 In rendering such decisions, judges are not free to
ignore the Constitution. And neither Congress nor the state legislatures
are empowered to amend the Constitution unilaterally. 15 Hence the doc-
trine of judicial review is born out of the power to interpret.16 This lim-
ited power to interpret, however, is not without costs. In particular,
Thayer recognized that "much which is harmful and unconstitutional
may take effect without any capacity in the courts to prevent it, since
their whole power is a judicial one."' 17
In this single sentence Thayer shows that he recognizes the salutary
role that courts play in forcing congressional enactments to conform to
the rule of law, as well as the dangerous proclivities of unchecked legisla-
tures. In fact, it was Thayer's fear of Congress rather than his fear of
courts that led him to caution the judiciary against being too aggressive
13 Id. at 142.
14 Id. at 135.
15 See U.S. CONsT. art. V.
16 Thayer, supra note 4, at 136.
17 Id. at 137-38.
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in repudiating legislative enactments. Thayer was concerned that if
judges asserted the primacy of the Constitution over the legislature too
aggressively, the legislature would react violently and threaten the very
existence of the independent judiciary.
In sum, one is at first tempted to argue that Thayer's cautious vision
of the role of the judiciary is at odds with the framers' views of human
nature because it gives popularly elected legislators too many degrees of
freedom. The framers planned to protect individual rights from erosion
by creating a constitutional structure of checks and balances, which,
along with various provisions of federalism, make it difficult for Congress
to pass laws. In other words, the framers wanted to create gridlock and
to raise the costs to Congress of passing laws. Thayer, by urging judges
to defer to Congress, would seem to be operating contrary to the Foun-
ders' design by promoting judicial behavior that would lower rather than
raise the costs to Congress of passing laws.
But a more careful reading of Thayer reveals that this is not the
case. Thayer's words of caution for the federal judiciary were based on
his recognition that the third branch, which relies on the other branches
for funding and for enforcement of its orders, is particularly vulnerable
to political attack. Thus, the proper reading of Thayer demonstrates that
he would have the judiciary marshall and conserve its resources by using
those resources only when absolutely necessary because the judiciary is at
once vulnerable and important.
One implication of Thayer's analysis is that the judiciary should al-
low itself to play a more active role in nullifying acts of Congress as its
prestige grows and as it becomes more secure in its position. However
precarious the status of the federal courts in 1793 or 1893, it seems quite
secure today. Thayer's worries about preserving the Court as an institu-
tion, therefore, do not seem as pressing as they may have a hundred years
ago. Put another way, Thayer urged caution in the judiciary's dealings
with the legislature because he was worried about the fragility of the judi-
ciary as an institution. That concern is less acute today. Thus, a dy-
namic reading of Thayer's article suggests that the judiciary should be
less cautious about exercising the power of judicial review since the bases
for Thayer's concerns about the "jealousy" of the other branches and the
public confidence in the judiciary have largely eroded. At the same time,
the beneficial effects of judicial review and the need for judicial protec-
tion against legislative excess have not diminished.
A second implication of Thayer's analysis is that the judiciary
should be made more autonomous vis-A-vis the political branches.
Thayer's arguments against judicial assertiveness can be summarized in
economic terms as follows. There are costs and benefits to judicial activ-
ism. The benefits come in the form of protecting the integrity of the
Constitution and curbing the excesses of the legislature. Indeed, Thayer
describes the independent judiciary as "the best preservative of the
88:226 (1993)
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[C]onstitution."' 8 On the other hand, the costs of judicial activism come
in the form of the risk that there will be a legislative backlash against the
judiciary that will "lead to measures ending in the total overthrow of the
independence of the judges."' 19 Given this cost-benefit calculus, it seems
clear that the way to avoid the costs while enjoying the benefits of judi-
cial activism is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary. This
could be done by making the judiciary self-funding and by depriving
Congress of the ability to alter the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
IV. NAGEL AND THE FRAMERS
James B. Thayer's contribution to intellectual discourse on constitu-
tional law was to bring into sharp focus the delicate nature of judicial
review. Robert Nagel takes a much different view of the nature of the
federal judiciary. Where Thayer wanted to protect and nurture the judi-
ciary's authority, Nagel wants to challenge and diminish that authority.
It is my argument that Nagel's view of the judiciary's role in consti-
tutional jurisprudence evinces a fundamental misunderstanding of both
the political theory of the framers and the role of democratic values in a
civil society. Indeed, it is ironic in this day and age, when distrust of
Congress is at an all-time high, that Professor Nagel can seriously argue
that the federal courts somehow stand as an impediment to Congress's
ability to serve the will of the people. Nagel's world view is that the
legislature is trying to serve the will of the people, while the courts are
getting in its way. My world view is that the legislature is bound and
determined to effectuate amorally redistributive wealth transfers and that
the courts are doing far too little to stop them.
Nagel alleges that Thayer's clear error rule will lead to a sort of
"false consciousness" among judges who convince themselves that they
are exercising admirable self-restraint when in fact they are usurping the
legislature's constitutional prerogatives. Nagel claims that Thayer's at-
tempt to control judges will have the unintended effect of expanding the
power of the judiciary by cloaking their decisions in a veil of legitimacy
and restraint that does not really exist. Nagel asserts that:
[A]s a realistic matter, Thayer's formulation is a recipe for creating a self-
deluding and imperious judiciary.
The self-image of judges employing the clear error rule will be pro-
foundly complacent. They must feel and announce great reluctance before
invalidating a statute. Even when, on a "just and true construction," a law
seems unconstitutional, they are to exercise restraint. Naturally, these
judges will be motivated to believe that they are highly selective in voiding
legislation and that, when they do, their judgments are specially justified.20
There are at least three problems with this formulation. First, it is
18 Id. at 142.
19 Id.
20 Nagel, supra note 5, at 201 (footnote omitted).
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counterfactual. In point of fact, judicial invalidations of congressional
acts are exceedingly rare. Thus, we simply do not observe a state of af-
fairs in which judges wring their hands while declaring acts of Congress
unconstitutional. Second, at best, Nagel's analysis succeeds only in iden-
tifying one of the costs of judicial activism. By ignoring the benefits of
such activism, he provides no basis for determining whether the net bene-
fits of activism exceed the cost that he identifies. This criticism is partic-
ularly telling in light of the fact that the particular cost Nagel identifies
has not manifested itself to any appreciable degree.
Finally, Nagel's analysis suffers because it presents an incomplete
and impoverished view of what law is. Under the American constitu-
tional scheme, a bill does not become law even though it is passed by
both houses of Congress. After being passed, it must be presented to the
President and either approved by him or else returned to the house in
which it originated. If returned, it must receive a two-thirds vote of that
house, as well as the other, in order to become law. Even then, however,
the constitutional scheme envisions that private citizens may have stand-
ing to challenge individual laws and that the federal courts construing
such laws will evaluate them for constitutional infirmity. The judiciary
validates and legitimizes the laws passed by Congress.
A. Nagel and the Facts
Professor Nagel's article starkly presumes that the federal courts are
running rampant over Congress. This is an empirical assertion, but the
only support marshaled for the assertion consists of a series of uncon-
vincing anecdotes. Indeed, besides the flag burning case,21 Nagel sup-
ports his point by looking at a series of cases in which the federal courts
have defended the rights of minorities or disadvantaged groups against
real or perceived attack by the legislature.22
The available empirical evidence suggests that, contrary to Professor
Nagel's presumption, judges rarely invalidate statutes on constitutional
grounds. For example, a study by Bill Landes and Richard Posner calcu-
lated the number of statutes invalidated as unconstitutional from 1789 to
1972. They found that only 97 acts of Congress were held unconstitu-
tional during this period.23
Of course, as I have argued elsewhere, it is possible for the federal
courts to thwart Congress's will through statutory construction as well as
judicial review. 24 In particular, interpreting statutes according to their
publicly stated purposes instead of their hidden, interest group motives
21 See id. at 202-03.
22 Id. at 197-99.
23 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcON. 875, 895-901 (1975).
24 Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpreta-
tion: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 226 (1986).
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will limit interest group capture by forcing interest groups and politicians
to publicize any nefarious purpose a "captured" statute has.25 But, as
Bill Eskridge has demonstrated, Congress is perfectly capable of overrid-
ing the Court's decisions construing federal statutes and in fact does so
with great frequency. 26
Thus, it is hard to know what to make of Professor Nagel's concerns
about judicial activism. Indeed, at times, Professor Nagel seems more
concerned with the Supreme Court's rhetoric than with its actions:
It is possible that every law struck down by the Supreme Court using
words like "irrational," "prejudiced," "invidious," "suppressive," and "de-
fiant" were, on the whole, bad laws. I also concede that some of the moti-
vations that went into their enactment may have been-probably were-
regrettable or even reprehensible. I still insist that we have become inured
to the extreme rhetoric the justices use in characterizing the decisions of
others. I also insist that, however ignorant or evil these other deci-
sionmakers may be, this rhetoric (as well as the "findings" and legal analy-
sis that it expresses) is inaccurate in that it does not leave enough room for
the difficulty of the judgments involved, the ambiguity of human motiva-
tions, and the complex nature of public decisionmaking. 27
But here Nagel confuses the Court's criticism of particular legisla-
tive enactments with criticism of the legislature itself. If Nagel were cor-
rect in his assessment, we would observe more tension between the courts
and the legislature than we do. The fact is that, rightly or wrongly, con-
stitutional jurisprudence over the past sixty years has resulted in a sort of
jurisdictional truce between Congress and the Court over the allocation
of authority to decide the constitutionality of particular issues. Congress
has essentially plenary authority to legislate in the area of economic
rights, while the Court has supreme authority to evaluate statutes that
involve noneconomic rights such as racial equality, freedom of expres-
sion, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion. 28
And, as anyone who observed the Senate confirmation hearings on
Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court must have recognized,
Congress simply does not want all the power the Court exercises. In-
deed, the Senators on the judiciary committee made it clear that the basic
problem with Bork's nomination was that his vision of the federal judici-
ary was far less intrusive than Congress would like. This point was made
most succinctly by Senator Edward Kennedy who, in a nationally tele-
vised speech, announced that
Robert Bork's America is a land in which women would be forced into back
25 Id. at 252-56.
26 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
27 Nagel, supra note 5, at 199.
28 See Jonathan R. Macey, Some Causes and Consequences of the Bifurcated Treatment of Eco-
nomic Rights and 'Other' Rights Under the United States Constitution, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 141
(1992).
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alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters, rogue police
could break down citizens' doors in midnight raids, schoolchildren could
not be taught about evolution, writers and artists would be censored at the
whim [of] government, and the doors of the Federal courts would be shut
on the fingers of millions of citizens for whom the judiciary is often the only
protector of the individual rights that are the heart of our democracy. 29
The Bork confirmation hearings presented the rare spectacle of a nomi-
nee who was promising legislators that as a judge he would not stand in
the way of their legislative plans, only to find the legislators howling in
protest at the prospect of such cooperation.
The point here is that even if Nagel is correct in opining that the
Court often takes an unnecessarily derogatory tone when it goes about
chastising Congress, this disrespect does not seem to offend the
lawmakers themselves very much. Indeed, it is not clear that the judici-
ary's lack of tact offends anyone other than Professor Nagel. The reason
for this seems clear. The federal courts' aggressive protection of
noneconomic liberties frees Congress by allowing it to be irresponsible.
The flag burning case is a perfect example. Individual members of Con-
gress can signal their patriotism and love for the flag by voting for a
clearly unconstitutional anti-flag-burning statute without any fear that
this enactment will actually become law.30 In this way, the federal courts
serve Congress's interests quite well. The same analysis applies in a vari-
ety of areas, such as abortion, where the Supreme Court's defense of
abortion rights has insulated Congress from having to deal with this
political hot potato.31
Perhaps the most perplexing aspect of Professor Nagel's argument is
his point that the views of judges and lawyers should be discounted be-
cause their modes of thought are "highly specialized and, therefore,
counter-intuitive to a broad range of the public."' 32 Similarly, Nagel ar-
gues that judges' opinions are not worth much because their views of
social issues like abortion, school desegregation, and religion are out of
the mainstream. Judges' views are aberrational, Nagel suggests, because
judges are from social classes that are educationally and socially distinct
from that of the general public.33
Nagel is probably right that judges are from elite groups within soci-
ety. But that is not the issue. The issue is whether judges are any more
29 133 CONG. REC. S9188 (daily ed. July 1, 1987).
30 Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 124, 125 (1992) (describing the Texas v. Johnson flag burning case as "as right and easy a
case in modern constitutional law as any I know"); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Cultures, 24 LAW
& Soc'Y REv. 199, 209 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES (1989))
(describing the case as "simple and straightforward").
31 Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regu-
lation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 75 VA. L. REV. 265, 286-90 (1990).
32 Nagel, supra note 5, at 205.
33 Id.
88:226 (1993)
HeinOnline -- 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 235 1993-1994
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
insulated from the real world than Congress. Both judges and congress-
men enjoy remarkable job security. Federal judges' job protection comes
from the life tenure provided by Article III of the Constitution. Con-
gressmen's job security comes from the awesome power of incumbency.
Moreover, Congress can hide from public scrutiny far better than judges.
Being only one of 435 members of Congress provides a remarkable de-
gree of anonymity. And even this anonymity can be enhanced by legisla-
tors who avoid roll call votes and other mechanisms that allow for
accountability. By contrast, judges must produce written opinions in
which they not only take responsibility for their decisions, but defend
them as well. In particular, justices on the Supreme Court are in the
public view to a far greater extent than most individual members of
Congress.
The available evidence indicates that Congress is almost completely
insulated from public scrutiny. Elections to Congress are becoming in-
creasingly uncompetitive. 34 The fact that incumbents are routinely re-
elected is so well known that the statistics need not be recounted here.35
Moreover, there is overwhelming evidence that the American people be-
lieve that Congress is dramatically out of touch with the feelings of the
American people. A review of thirty-five national surveys conducted be-
tween 1975 and 1990 that asked whether people approved or disapproved
of what Congress was doing found a consistently high rate of popular
disapproval of Congress's performance. 36
More importantly, Gallup polls taken in 1981 and 1989, asking
Americans about their confidence in a wide range of social and political
institutions, found that the Supreme Court ranked considerably higher
than Congress in the esteem of the American people. As Everett Carli
Ladd has observed:
When Congress's standing is compared with that of a variety of other insti-
tutions besides the presidency, the same picture is evident. For example,
Gallup asks its respondents whether they have "a great deal, quite a lot,
some, or very little" confidence in the military, banks, the Supreme Court,
and other institutions. Congress is consistently back in the pack. It always
lags well behind churches, the military, public schools and the Supreme
Court. Its peers are such relatively low-rated institutions as organized la-
bor, television, and big business.37
Thus, Nagel's claim that the Supreme Court is an elitist institution
that is out of touch with the American people may be true. But if so, the
nine justices have managed to fool a lot of people over a sustained period
of time. Moreover, since Nagel is discussing judicial review of congres-
34 Everett Caril Ladd, Public Opinion and the "Congress Problem", PUB. INTEREST, Summer
1990, at 57, 58.
35 See id.
36 Id. at 61.
37 Id. at 62.
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sional enactments, the critical question is not whether the Court is elitist
(and hence out of touch with public issues) in some abstract or absolute
sense, but whether the Court is more out of touch with public issues than
is Congress.
Once again, the available evidence runs counter to Professor Nagel's
assertions. Nagel portrays the Court as an elitist, out-of-touch institution
that obstructs Congress's valiant effort to carry out widely shared social
policies. By contrast, a substantial majority of people believe that Con-
gress is in fact an elitist institution filled with people who (1) lie when the
truth will hurt them politically; (2) care more about special interests than
ordinary citizens; (3) make campaign promises they have no intention of
fulfilling; and (4) make a lot of money using public office improperly. 38
Again, it appears that nobody except Professor Nagel really believes that
the Supreme Court is thwarting the will of a large portion of the Ameri-
can public by impeding the good works of Congress.
B. A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Nagel's Arguments
Professor Nagel claims that the judiciary's lack of sufficient defer-
ence to Congress harms society because it results in the nullification of
laws that would increase human flourishing and happiness. In other
words, Professor Nagel believes that the Court's refusal to yield to what
he regards as majoritarian preferences imposes costs on society because
the American people get less of some things of which they, as a whole,
would like to have more.
I have no doubt that Professor Nagel is correct about this. For ex-
ample, there is no question that if Professor Nagel's views of constitu-
tional law were shared by a majority of the Supreme Court, there would
be less flag burning, more school prayer, fewer abortions, and more dis-
crimination against racial minorities in the private sector. But even if
one were to assume (and not even Professor Nagel is willing to assume
this) that all of these outcomes would constitute improvements for soci-
ety, the complete abdication to congressional will that Professor Nagel
advocates should not be endorsed until the costs of his regime are
considered.
One cost of Professor Nagel's jurisprudential vision is that the
Supreme Court will no longer serve as a source of moral instruction for
America. Clearly, Professor Nagel is correct that the Supreme Court
does some unpopular things. This point is almost banal. But the Court's
unpopular decisions (including Brown v. Board of Education) have had a
powerful and salutary educational effect on the American people that
should not be ignored in any cost-benefit calculation of judicial review.
People ultimately got used to the idea of desegregated schools, and now
desegregation enjoys widespread public support.
38 Id. at 63 (citing an ABC News/Washington Post survey taken in May 1989).
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Another cost of Professor Nagel's jurisprudential vision is that his
hyper-deferential approach would increase judicial error. The Supreme
Court is not infallible. It makes mistakes. In the context of judicial re-
view, these mistakes come in two forms. First, justices run the risk of
declaring laws unconstitutional when they are not. Second, justices run
the risk of declaring laws to be consistent with the Constitution when in
fact they violate it. Professor Nagel's approach to jurisprudence has the
benefit of reducing the second type of judicial error, but it has the defect
of increasing the first. In my judgment, one need only look to the Kore-
matsu case,39 involving the internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese de-
scent during World War II, to conclude that reducing the second type of
judicial error is a higher priority than reducing the first type.
Finally, Professor Nagel's analysis does not distinguish between in-
dividual rights and legislative preferences. In other words, his analysis
does not admit to the fact that legislative preferences may at times inter-
fere with individual rights. But it is clear that this is often the case. Pro-
fessor Nagel offers no explanation for why legislative preferences-even
if they reflect the will of the majority-should trump individual rights
provided for in the Constitution. Put another way, Professor Nagel's vi-
sion of judicial restraint could be achieved only through a sacrifice of
individual rights that people count on the federal courts to protect. Un-
fortunately, Professor Nagel considers only the benefits of his system of
judicial restraint. Any serious consideration of the desirability of such a
system must take account of the costs as well.
C. Nagel and the Founders' Design
My final and most serious concern with Professor Nagel's perspec-
tive on judicial review is its lack of grounding in constitutional theory.
Nagel asserts that judges are elitist and out of touch with "the people."
But, as I have shown above, so is Congress. More importantly, Nagel
asserts that judicial interference with legislative acts is deplorable be-
cause it substitutes the antimajoritarian, and hence illegitimate, views of
judges for the majoritarian, and hence legitimate, views of the legislature.
In other words, Professor Nagel's notions of judicial review contain
an unstated theory of representation. Implicit in his view of democracy
is the erroneous idea that actions of elected representatives have a moral
legitimacy deriving from the very fact that these representatives are
elected. This romanticized view of representative democracy was not
shared by the framers.
The Federalists considered and dismissed the argument that the
purpose of democracy and majority rule is to legitimize the actions of
elected officials.40 The framers believed that democracy should play a
39 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
40 Jonathan R. Macey, Representative Democracy, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 49, 51 (1993).
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checking function rather than the legitimating function envisioned by
Professor Nagel:
The Federalists saw democracy as a check on government because it al-
lowed citizens to unseat incompetent rulers and thereby align the interests
of governmental actors with those of the electorate. This understanding of
representative democracy was strongly influenced by John Locke, who be-
lieved that the purpose of democracy was to allow the people to judge their
government. 41
In other words, Professor Nagel's idea that judges lack the legiti-
macy of popularly elected officials is based on the assumption that win-
ning an election confers legitimacy on the actions of such elected officials.
But this misconstrues the purpose of democratic elections in the Ameri-
can political system. The purpose of such elections is not to establish a
system in which the people rule through their elected representatives.
Rather, the purpose is to permit the people to sit as "judges, able to
check the legislature." 42
Thus, imbedded within Professor Nagel's approach to judicial re-
view is a theory of representation far different from that embraced by the
framers. This in turn leads Professor Nagel to a theory of government
far different from that conceived in the Constitution. The framers re-
jected the idea of voting as a means of legitimizing legislative acts, for
they feared that certain factions would be able to form effective political
coalitions and so deprive less powerful factions of fundamental rights.
In other words, where the framers were concerned with the power
of democracy to undermine the rights of the politically weak, Professor
Nagel is concerned with the power of the judiciary to thwart the will of
the politically powerful. In Nagel's view, once the people have spoken
through their lawfully elected representatives, the judiciary should do
nothing to impede the swift implementation of their will. But the Ameri-
can constitutional system is full of devices explicitly designed to raise
rather than to lower the decision costs of government. The bicameral
legislature, the rules regarding the size and composition of the House and
the Senate, the executive veto, the presentment requirement, the separa-
tion of powers, and judicial review all constitute structural devices
designed to make it more difficult for a transitory majority coalition to
pass laws.
Modem public choice theory demonstrates conclusively what the
framers understood intuitively, namely that not all groups enjoy equal
access to the political process. Indeed, laws are likely to benefit the few
at the expense of the many by transferring wealth from widely dispersed,
poorly organized interests to those discrete, well-organized groups that
enjoy superior access to the political process. Elected representatives will
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wealth and economic efficiency in order to benefit these favored groups.43
As Bruce Ackerman has observed, the principal defense given in The
Federalist Papers for ratification of the new Constitution was that it laid
the "foundations for a different kind of politics-where well organized
groups try to manipulate government in pursuit of their narrow
interests."44
Thus, where Professor Nagel attacks the judiciary for being
antimajoritarian and elitist, I, like the framers, worry far more about
Congress's susceptibility to interest group capture, small-mindedness,
and corruption. To the extent that judicial review reduces these
problems, the game is worth the candle.
V. CONCLUSION
At a superficial level, there is a striking similarity between the works
of Professor Nagel and Professor Thayer because both strongly advocate
judicial restraint. But there the similarity ends. Professor Thayer fa-
vored judicial restraint out of a desire to nurture and protect the judici-
ary, which he viewed as a fragile institution, from more powerful social
and political forces that would destroy it. By contrast, Professor Nagel
favors judicial restraint out of a dislike for judges whom he somehow
manages to regard simultaneously as both self-deluding and imperious.
The more profound difference between Professors Nagel and Thayer
lies in their differing views of the legitimacy of Congress. Nagel sees
Congress as closely aligned with the people, where Thayer clearly under-
stood both the potential for legislative abuse and the role of the judiciary
in checking such abuse. Thus, in the end, Thayer's vision of the federal
judiciary is much more intellectually robust, and much more consistent
with the American constitutional system of limited government charac-
terized by checks and balances, than the unfettered democracy champi-
oned by Professor Nagel.
43 See Macey, supra note 24, at 230, 242-50.
44 Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1020 (1984).
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